According to unconscious thought theory, complex decisions are best made after a period of distraction assumed to elicit ''unconscious thought.'' Here, the authors suggest instead that the superiority of decisions made after distraction results from the fact that conscious deliberation can deteriorate impressions formed on-line during information acquisition. The authors found that participants instructed to form an impression made better decisions after distraction than after deliberation, thereby replicating earlier findings. However, decisions made immediately were just as good as decisions made after distraction, which suggests (a) that people had already made their decision during information acquisition, (b) that deliberation without attention does not occur during distraction, and (c) that ruminating about one's first impression can deteriorate decision quality. Strikingly, in another condition that should have favored unconscious thought even more, deliberated decisions were better than immediate or distracted decisions. These findings were replicated in a field study.
is available, we also observed that conscious thought enhances the quality of decisions in the absence of such prior first impressions. We demonstrated this pattern of results both in a laboratory experiment, in which the quality of decision was defined normatively, and in a field study, in which we examined shoppers' satisfaction after a complex purchase.
The Structure of the UTT Decision Task
The core demonstration of UTT's purported superiority of unconscious versus conscious decision making is based on the following paradigm: Prior to information acquisition, participants are instructed to form an impression of the choice objects (preacquisition instructions). Next, information about three or four objects such as cars or apartments, among which one is characterized by more positive features than the others (typically 9, 6, 6, and 3 positive features among 12), is presented to participants (information acquisition). During a subsequent ''postacquisition period,'' participants either perform a distraction task, hypothesized to elicit unconscious thought, or have to deliberate about their decision for a fixed amount of time (typically 4 min) during which they cannot consult the information anymore. Finally, participants assess the alternatives.
In a series of previous studies, we explored this paradigm extensively and found, congruent with prior research (McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994) , that the preacquisition instructions given to participants (''form an impression'') promote on-line judgments (see Hastie & Park, 1986) . Indeed, in a post-task questionnaire, 69.5% of participants reported that they had already made their decision toward choice objects during information acquisition (Waroquier, Klein, Marchiori, & Cleeremans, 2008 ; also see Waroquier, Marchiori, Klein, & Cleeremans, 2009 ). This finding prompted us to question the validity of the standard UTT decision task. Indeed, according to UTT, activation of a decision goal is required for ''unconscious thought'' to take place. Bos, Dijksterhuis, and van Baaren (2008) showed that in the absence of a goal distraction did not result in better decisions. In other words, if people have already committed to a choice before distraction takes place, unconscious thought should not occur because the goal of ''forming an impression'' is already completed. Moreover, on-line decisions do not meet the criteria for ''unconscious thought,'' for it is assumed not to operate during information acquisition but rather only after information has been acquired consciously (Dijksterhuis, 2004) .
Based on these considerations, we therefore decided to manipulate the extent to which people can form first impressions during information acquisition by modifying task instructions. One condition replicated the original task: Participants were instructed to ''form an impression'' before receiving the information. In the other condition, we instructed participants to memorize alternatives' attributes (also see Lassiter et al., 2009) . Crossed with the processing instructions, we assigned participants to one of three postacquisition conditions (immediate vs. deliberation vs. distraction). In one condition, participants immediately reported their attitude after information had been presented, whereas in the two other conditions they were asked either to consider their decision or to solve anagrams before reporting their attitudes. Importantly, after information had been presented but before engaging in the postacquisition period, participants were informed that they would have to assess the alternatives later. Demonstrating that decisions made after distraction are better than those made immediately constitutes the strongest possible test of UTT, particularly when, as was the case in our study, (a) participants had received a proper goal and (b) the possibility of making on-line judgments was minimized. Indeed, without such a control condition, it is impossible to disentangle the effects of distraction from those of conscious deliberation. Although earlier research has fulfilled some of these requirements (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Lassiter et al., 2009 ), we believe this study is the first to fulfill all of them. Experiment 1, which involved 294 participants, is an implementation of this design. Experiment 2 replicates Experiment 1 in a field study with actual shoppers.
Experiment 1 Method
Participants and design. A total of 294 participants (201 women and 93 men; age M ¼ 20), involved in various curricula at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, were randomly assigned to one of six conditions resulting from crossing two factors: Decision Mode (deliberation vs. distraction vs. immediate) and Processing Goal (impression formation vs. memorization).
Procedure. Depending on the condition, participants were instructed either to ''form an impression in order to later assess four apartments'' (impression formation condition) or ''to memorize the features characterizing each apartment'' (memorization condition). They were then exposed to 48 attributes (12 for each apartment) each displayed individually for 8 seconds in a counterbalanced order. The normatively best apartment was described with 75% positive attributes, the average apartments were described with 50% positive attributes, and the worst apartment was described with only 25% positive attributes.
After information had been presented, participants in the ''immediate'' condition reported their attitude toward each of the four apartments. In both the ''deliberation'' and ''distraction'' conditions, participants were told (through an instruction display shown for 20 s) that they would have to assess apartments at a later stage. These instructions were shown because UTT assumes that unconscious thought is goal dependent (Bos et al., 2008) . Next, over a period of 4 min (postacquisition period), participants were asked either to carefully consider their decision (deliberation) or to solve anagrams (distraction). After 4 min had elapsed, participants provided their attitude toward each apartment by answering the question, ''How do you judge these apartments?'' on four continuous scales ranging from extremely negative to extremely positive (subsequently recoded on a 100-point scale).
To check that the Processing Goal manipulation was efficient, after the different phases of the experiment had been summarized for them, participants were asked (a) from which point they had fixed their opinion about the apartments (1 ¼ during the information presentation phase, 2 ¼ during the reflection/anagram solving phase, 3 ¼ during the evaluation phase, 4 ¼ never), (b) to what extent they had intentionally tried to forge an opinion regarding the apartments during information presentation (1 ¼ I did not try at all, 9 ¼ I tried very hard), and (c) to what extent they had formed an impression of the apartments during this phase (1 ¼ I did not form an impression at all, 9 ¼ I formed a very accurate impression).
To verify that the Decision Mode manipulation was efficient, we also asked participants (a) what percentage of their attention had been devoted to each of the four apartments versus unrelated thoughts and (b) to what extent they had thought about the apartments during the postacquisition period (1 ¼ not at all, 9 ¼ extensively).
Given that actively forming an on-line impression leads to superior memory than trying to memorize information (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Fiedler, Kaczor, Haarmann, Stegmüller, & Maloney, 2008) , we also included, as an additional check of the Processing Goal manipulation, a recognition task in which participants had to match the four apartments with each of the 24 attributes (12 criteria either positive or negative). Given that the processing goal was evaluative, we assumed that memory for the best apartment was particularly likely to benefit from the impression formation instructions.
Results
Manipulation checks and memorization quality. As expected, more participants reported that they had fixed their attitudes (i.e., they did not change their opinion after this point) toward the apartments after information acquisition in the memorization condition (35.37%) than in the impression formation condition (11.56%), w 2 (292) ¼ 23.20, p < .01. Moreover, participants in the impression formation condition (M ¼ 7.07, SE ¼ 0.16) reported having tried harder to form an impression about the apartments during information acquisition than participants in the memorization condition
Finally, participants reported having formed a more accurate impression during information acquisition in the impression formation condition
In the deliberation condition, participants reported that they had devoted a higher percentage of their attention to the apartments (Ms ¼ 84.27 and 24.46, SE ¼ 3.15), F(1, 292) ¼ 179.96, p < .01, and that they had thought more about the apartments (Ms ¼ 5.65 and 1.93, SE ¼ 0.19), F(1, 292) ¼ 190.92, p < .01, during the postacquisition period than did participants in the distraction condition.
To assess memory, we computed a memory score (corrected for guessing) for each apartment by adding the number of correctly recognized attributes and the number of correctly rejected attributes for each of them (M correct responses ¼ 49%). Scores on each apartment were subjected to a mixed analysis of variance with Processing Goal as a between-subjects factor.
Beside a trivial main effect of the repeated factor, F(3, 876) ¼ 34.36, p < .001, Z 2 ¼ .105, this analysis yielded a main effect of Processing Goal, F(1, 292) ¼ 6.98, p < .01, Z 2 ¼ .23, qualified by an interaction with the apartment, F(3, 876) ¼ 5.50, p < .01, Z 2 ¼ .18. Overall, participants memorized the information better when they had been instructed to form an impression (51%) rather than to memorize attributes (48%). However, although memorization was better for the best apartment in the impression formation condition (62% vs. 52%), F(1, 292) ¼ 18.37, p < .001, Z 2 ¼ .59, there was no difference for the other apartments. Decision quality. As in previous research (Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; Lassiter et al., 2009) , we used the difference between the attitude toward the best apartment and the mean attitude toward the other apartments as an index of decision quality. Larger values of this index reflect a stronger preference for the (normatively) best apartment. Decision quality was examined as a function of Processing Goal and Decision Mode. An analysis of variance yielded a significant effect of Processing Goal, F(1, 288) ¼ 18.10, p < .001, Z 2 ¼ .059, qualified by an interaction with Decision Mode, F(2, 288) ¼ 3.37, p < .05, Z 2 ¼. 23. Contrary to UTT's predictions, judgments performed after a period of distraction were equivalent to those performed immediately after receiving the information (see Figure 1) . Importantly, in both the immediate and the distraction conditions, preventing participants from making their decision on-line (i.e., under memorization instructions) decreased the quality of their decisions, Fs(1, 288) > 10, ps < .005, Z 2 s > .035. By contrast, participants engaged in deliberation performed fairly well independently of Processing Goal, F(1, 288) ¼ 0.13, p > .7, Z 2 ¼ .000.
Discussion
Experiment 1 provides a critical test of UTT's predictions because decisions made after a period of distraction were compared to those made immediately after information acquisition in a choice task that prevented on-line judgments while also providing a proper decision goal before engaging in the distraction period (see Bos et al., 2008) . Contrary to UTT, the quality of decisions made after distraction was dependent on the The quality of these decisions was very high when a high-quality first impression was available (impression condition), whereas it was very poor when first impressions were of poor quality (memorization quality). An almost identical pattern was obtained in the immediate condition in which decision quality was necessarily a function of on-line processes. By contrast, participants engaged in deliberation performed fairly well independently of the quality of on-line impressions. This yielded (in line with the results of an apparent advantage of decisions made after distraction over those made after deliberation. However, given that decision quality was almost identical in the immediate and distraction conditions, it is unlikely that decision-relevant processes occur during distraction, as suggested by UTT. A more parsimonious account is that although participants simply report a first impression formed on-line after distraction, conscious thinking can deteriorate decisions that have already been made or conversely improve decisions when no high-quality first impression is available. Which processes best explain our findings? Examining the results in the ''immediate'' condition allows us to properly evaluate the effect of the processing goal manipulation. When instructed to ''form an impression,'' participants who subsequently made their decision immediately were able to differentiate the best apartment from the others: Their difference in attitude (expressed on a 100-point scale) was 29 points.
1 This implies that the alternatives had been properly compared during information acquisition. Because there is no reason to assume that participants in the deliberation and in the immediate conditions formed different impressions during information acquisition, the observed difference in decision quality between these two groups is necessarily dependent on comparative processes that took place during the postacquisition period. Thus, because the information was no longer available during this period, we surmise that participants in the deliberation condition adjusted their first impressions by reexamining their memory of the attributes of each apartment. Crucially, however, this reassessment cannot yield good results in the absence of the relevant information; indeed, memory of the attributes is rather poor (50% correct answers in the recognition task). Under these conditions, a parsimonious account for our findings is that deliberation deteriorates the high-quality first impressions that people had formed on-line.
By contrast, in the memorization condition, participants who had to provide their attitudes immediately failed to properly differentiate the best option from the others: The difference in attitude was only 7 points (not significantly different from zero). This implies that the alternatives had been poorly compared during information acquisition. Here, we likewise suggest that in the deliberation condition participants carried out the comparison between alternatives during the postacquisition period on the basis of their memory for the attributes and thus adjusted their first impressions. In this case, however, because differentiation was very poor after information acquisition, this conscious comparison process made it possible for participants to compensate for the lack of on-line comparison and thus to enhance the quality of their decisions.
Although the verbal reports used to check the efficiency of our manipulations may be tainted by the well-known flaws of introspection (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) , the pattern of findings observed on the memory measure suggests that the processing goal manipulation was efficient. Indeed, memorization was better under ''impression formation'' instructions, which is consistent with the literature (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Fiedler et al., 2008) . This effect was strongest for the best apartment, which further supports that a more accurate on-line evaluation was formed in this condition. Finally, the greater differentiation displayed under impression formation instructions in the immediate condition (where decision quality was a function of on-line processes) implies that the impression formation goal (i.e., evaluate the alternatives) manipulation was effective.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 extends the results of Experiment 1 to people faced with real decisions. In light of our previous results, we also aimed at offering a conceptual replication of the study conducted by Dijksterhuis et al. (2006, Experiment 3) , who found that postchoice satisfaction among shoppers of complex products was negatively correlated with the amount of thought participants reported having devoted to their purchase.
More specifically, we examined the relationship between indecisiveness and amount of thought on shoppers' postchoice satisfaction with complex products. Indeed, indecisiveness is associated with process characteristics of decision making, such as decision latency, required amount of information, and reluctance to decide (Rassin & Muris, 2005; Reed, 1985) . Thus, we assume that indecisiveness exerts a similar effect on decision makers as our experimental manipulation: It delays attitude fixation and promotes further processing of information. Moreover, lack of differentiation between alternatives is the most frequent source of uncertainty among decision makers, and conscious deliberation is one strategy to cope with uncertainty (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997) .
Method
Participants. Participants (21 women and 18 men; age M ¼ 36.8) voluntarily completed an Internet survey.
Procedure. Experiment 2's method was similar to that of Dijksterhuis et al. (2006, Experiment 3) ; however, we focused only on complex products (complexity score > 3; see the online supporting material of .
2 Participants were presented with a list of products (e.g., car, room, camera, etc.) and were asked to select up to three products they had purchased recently. They were then asked the following questions: (a) ''Did you consider buying this product or this kind of product before you went on the shopping trip?'' (yes, no); (b) ''How much did you think about the product between the moment you considered the purchase and the moment you 
Results
Following , we examined only products that participants had considered buying beforehand (68 observations), 3 as it is unlikely that impulsive buyers think much at all either consciously or unconsciously about their purchase. Furthermore, as it is impossible to measure whether people engage in unconscious thought, we simply assumed, as Dijksterhuis et al., that the amount of ''unconscious thought'' would be negatively linked with the (reported) amount of conscious thought.
Given that some participants picked several products, we computed the intraclass correlation for satisfaction with each purchase within participants. This correlation was not significant, which made it possible to treat observations (i.e., each purchase) as independent measures (r ¼ .17, p > .2; e.g., Bickel, 2006) . After having centered variables and computed the interaction term by multiplying centered variables, we regressed amount of thought, indecisiveness, and their interaction on postchoice satisfaction. 4 This analysis produced only the predicted interaction between amount of thought and indecisiveness (b ¼ .55, p < .005). Following Aiken and West (1991) , we computed simple slopes of the amount of thought on satisfaction for three conditional values of indecisiveness (at one SD below the mean, at the mean, and at one SD above the mean). As can be seen in Figure 2 , amount of thought was positively linked to satisfaction for highly indecisive participants (b ¼ .33, p < .005). For an average level of indecisiveness, amount of thought was not associated with satisfaction (b ¼ .09, p > 1). In contrast, amount of thought was negatively linked with satisfaction for participants who were low in indecisiveness (b ¼ -.15, p < .05).
Finally, we examined the relationship between indecisiveness and postchoice amount of thought and found, congruent with the literature (Reed, 1985) , that those two measures were positively linked (r ¼ .29, p < .05).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 replicate Experiment 1's findings with actual shoppers. That is, conscious deliberation enhanced purchase satisfaction for undecided shoppers, but it had the opposite effect on shoppers with a clear idea of their purchase. Thus, insofar as complex products are concerned, we replicate the results of , but, crucially, only for those participants who were low in indecisiveness. It is possible that samples differed in terms of their baseline level of indecisiveness.
General Discussion
The main goal of our studies was to reassess UTT, and particularly the idea that ''unconscious thought'' is advantageous when making complex decisions. The results of Experiment 1 show that decisions made immediately, that is, without any further thinking, conscious or otherwise, were just as good as decisions made after a period of distraction. This was true when participants were given the opportunity to form an impression of the material during information acquisition. More strikingly, this obtained in the very conditions that, according to UTT, should have been the most likely to elicit ''unconscious thought,'' for participants were (a) prevented from making an on-line judgment (through memorization instructions) and (b) were given a proper decision goal before engaging in the distraction period. This pattern of results is more parsimoniously explained without endorsing UTT's assumption that decisionrelevant unconscious processes occur during distraction.
However, we also replicated Dijksterhuis et al.'s (2006) main finding that under impression formation instructions, deciding after a period of deliberation results in worse performance than after distraction. This suggests that additional deliberation about one's first impression can actually deteriorate decision quality. Crucially, this pattern reversed for people instructed not to form an impression but to simply memorize the material: In this case, participants made better decisions in the deliberation condition than in other conditions. This finding suggests that thinking actually helps when one has not properly compared alternatives and not committed to a decision yet.
Experiment 2 involved decisions taken by real-life shoppers. Undecided participants were more satisfied the longer they had thought about their purchase. Assuming that they did not clearly differentiate between the alternatives (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997) and needed more time to process the information (Rassin & Muris, 2005; Reed, 1985) , they behaved like participants in the memory conditions of Experiment 1. The opposite pattern was obtained for participants who were not indecisive before making their purchase. Here, the more thinking, the less satisfaction. In this case, conscious deliberation might have modified participants' initial adaptive preferences (see Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson & Schooler, 1991) . Furthermore, committed shoppers who nevertheless continue to think about the alternatives probably weaken their initial preferences by considering the positive aspects of other options, which may in turn decrease postchoice satisfaction. Of course, we should emphasize that we do not claim that first impressions are necessarily correct. It would be useful to take other moderating variables, such as expertise, into account (e.g., Sadler-Smith & Burke, 2009 ).
In our laboratory study, the accurate decisions made by participants immediately after receiving the information in the impression formation condition are best explained in terms of conscious thought rather than in terms of fast unconscious processes such as intuition (see Dane & Pratt, 2007) , given that participants had an explicit ''impression formation'' goal. However, in the field study, the adaptive preferences shown by participants who were not indecisive and who did not think much can be explained either in terms of fast conscious processes or in terms of fast unconscious processes.
Our results are at odds with findings that distraction enhances performance relative to an immediate condition (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Lerouge, 2009) . However, in the only published meta-analysis (Acker, 2008) , this effect was not significant (but see another meta-analysis by Strick et al., 2009) . A more recent challenge comes from two studies interpreted as demonstrating that unconscious thought occurs after information acquisition (Strick, Dijksterhuis, & van Baaren, in press ). Despite their appeal, these findings should be interpreted cautiously given that in Study 1 the level of on-line processing was estimated on post hoc verbal reports rather than manipulated experimentally and that in Study 2 the difference between conditions on the focal measure (i.e., correlation between on-line preferences and final choice) was not significant.
Given these inconsistent or inconclusive findings, method quality is particularly important, and studies should be considered in light of their methodological standards. We believe that, in this respect at least, Experiment 1 is superior to previous studies.
First, attributes were pretested and matched in importance. Second, the order of presentation of the attributes was matched across conditions, which is particularly important in view of the large order effects typically observed in on-line decision tasks (Asch, 1946; Newell et al., 2009) . Third, in contrast to earlier studies (e.g., Lassiter et al., 2009) , we included several manipulation checks. Finally, and most importantly, given that standard UTT experimental instructions elicit on-line judgments (Lassiter et al., 2009; Waroquier et al., 2008 ), it appears theoretically unclear why differences between distraction and immediate conditions should be observed under these instructions. Unconscious thought is a goal-directed process (Bos et al., 2008) and is not expected to take place if the decision goal has already been fulfilled. For these reasons, we believe that the comparison between the immediate and the distraction conditions under memory instructions provided in Experiment 1 constitutes the strongest test of UTT's predictions available so far, both methodologically and conceptually.
Finally, it is important to stress that we claim neither that decisions are always best taken consciously nor that decision making exclusively involves conscious processes. Indeed, there is substantial evidence (e.g., Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008 ) that simple decisions can be predicted based on brain activity well before people become aware of committing to a particular course of action. This is congruent with Wegner's (2002) notion that ''conscious will is an illusion.'' Most likely, any decision is the result of a complex mixture of conscious and unconscious processes. However, we also think that certain kinds of information processing, particularly those involving propositional reasoning that involves symbol manipulation, can occur only with consciousness.
Naturally, the correlational data that we collected in Experiment 2 open the way to alternative interpretations. Taken together, however, our studies suggest that instead of recommending people to ''think unconsciously'' about a decision-a double-bind injunction (Bateson, Jackson, Haley, & Weakland, 1956 ) that most people would find rather hard to follow-we should rather recommend the following: If you have a clear first impression, it is often wise to stick to it; if you don't, think a bit more!
